Freedom as Control

In the 4th book of his Meditations, René Descartes makes an assertion that is as unintuitive as it is controversial—he repudiates the common conception of freedom as the freedom to choose otherwise. He does so by arguing that when one is indifferent enough to have the ability to choose otherwise, they render themselves less free than those who lack indifference in their decision-making. Here, I analyze exactly how Descartes supposes an individual makes decisions and how one can come to make an error based on that model. Following this analysis, I’ll explain why Descartes asserts that indifference lessens freedom. Finally, I’ll briefly examine the merits of the popular and Cartesian accounts of freedom. To come to an understanding of how one’s freedom can be diminished when it comes to decision-making, it’s important to first understand what decision-making is. According to Descartes, decision-making depends on two entities working in unison: one’s intellect and one’s will. The intellect is a perfect faculty given to us by God that allows us to understand ideas correctly. When it comes to decision-making, the intellect’s function is merely to, “...enable [one] to perceive the ideas which are subjects for possible judgments…” (Descartes, 39). In other words, the intellect is responsible for understanding ideas correctly and presenting those ideas for judgment. Now, the faculty responsible for judging the ideas that the intellect puts forth is known as the ‘will.’ The will consists in the ability one has, “...to affirm or to deny or to pursue or to avoid…” the ideas put forth by the intellect (40). So, decision-making occurs when the intellect puts forth an idea that can be judged and the will judges it: either to affirm or deny or pursue or avoid. Error, then, occurs when there is a dysfunction in this decision-making process. When used correctly, the intellect and will work in harmony to make the right decisions whenever confronted with a choice. However, it’s clear to see that we do not always make the right decision: as Descartes puts it, “...I know by experience that I am prone to countless errors…” (38). Descartes asserts that these errors in judgment occur when the will begins to judge matters which are beyond the understanding of the intellect— in other words, when one judges things that one does not understand. Since the will does not have a perfect understanding of these ideas, it becomes indifferent to its judgment of them, “...turns aside from what is true…”, and errs in judgment (41). With the mechanics of error out of the way, I’ll briefly explain what renders a decision ‘freely made.’ A decision is made freely when the judgments of the will are not determined by any external force (40). In other words, my decision is freely made whenever I am in complete control of my decision-making. Importantly, freedom in this sense does not necessitate having the ability to choose any which way: even if I am only capable of choosing ‘X,’ my choice is made freely insofar as I choose ‘X’ independently of any external forces. This is the point at which Descartes takes this concept a step further by asserting that having the ability to choose otherwise actually renders us less free. According to Descartes, this is because having the ability to choose otherwise indicates that we are, to some extent, indifferent— that we are not entirely sure which option is the right one (40). To elucidate what such indifference looks like in practice, consider the following example. Suppose that two wills, Will A and Will B, are tasked to affirm or deny the following idea: all apples are blue. Will B has never seen an apple and does not understand what an apple is. As such, Will B is indifferent as to whether to affirm or deny the idea. Because Will B is indifferent, Descartes asserts that whatever judgment Will B does come to will be made with the “...lowest grade of freedom…” (40). Will A, on the other hand, has seen all manner of apples and understands that they aren’t all blue. As a result of this understanding, Will A cannot be indifferent and must deny the idea, as it clearly understands it to be incorrect. Descartes seems to think that Will A’s kind of decision-making is the more free one of the two. Though Descartes’ reasoning for why Will B’s choice is less free is a bit arcane, it seems to come down to the idea that indifference affects our control in the decision-making process. Suppose that my motivation in making a decision is to make the right decision. That is, to affirm ideas that ought to be affirmed and deny ideas that ought to be denied. If this is the case, then my control over the decisions I make comes down to my control over whether or not I can make the right decision, since I will be aiming to do so whenever my will decides one way or another. Recall that my freedom in decision-making comes down to whether or not I control the decisions I make— here, whether or not I control my making the right decision. When viewed as such, it’s clear that the less I know what the right decision is (i.e. the more indifferent I am), the less control I have over making the right decision. And, the less control that I have over making the right decision, the less free I am when I make the decision. So, the more indifferent I am in making a decision, the less free I am when I make it. Because indifference manifests itself in the ability to do otherwise, and based on the preceding logic, Descartes asserts that the ability to do otherwise is a sign of the lowest grade of freedom. Now that we’ve established why Descartes believes that the ability to do otherwise renders one less free, I’ll end with a brief analysis of whether Cartesian freedom is a better model than freedom as the ability to do otherwise. I think freedom as the ability to do otherwise is the better account of freedom as it better encompasses what freedom is, intuitively. For instance, Cartesian freedom seems to allow for one to live a kind of life wherein they only ever have one option when it comes to every ‘decision’ they make— to live a life where every decision they make is predictable and set. This highly deterministic view seems not to be freedom in any meaningful sense: the essence of freedom lies in spontaneity— the ability to arbitrarily choose something, even if it is the ‘wrong’ choice, all things considered. It’s this essence that is better captured by the view of freedom as the ability to do otherwise. Under this view, one’s freedom is defined by one’s ability to do as they please. It vests the power of freedom in oneself, instead of a predictable algorithm set up through the intellect and will. It allows for one— indeed, it requires one to be able to— arbitrarily choose on no other basis than their whims. I think this definition of freedom better encompasses how we tend to conceptualize freedom, and because of its intuitiveness, I think it’s the better account.