Rousseau Examined

In his work, The First and Second Discourses, Jean-Jacques Rousseau speculates that the root of human evil is not human nature, but human civilization. Though Rousseau’s model does present a compelling origin for evil when applied to certain case studies, I’ll argue that its proposed pre-civilization human being is far from plausible. First, I'll argue that the Hobbesian model for pre-civilization humanity is stronger. Then, after examining a potential rejoinder for Rousseau, I’ll conclude my examination by arguing that Rousseau’s model for the state of nature ultimately fails because it requires the reader to accept an impossible state of affairs. Because Rousseau’s position is that civilization makes humans evil, he’s committed to the idea that pre-civilization humans were not evil. Rousseau calls this pre-civilization state of affairs the ‘state of nature.’ Rousseau argues that, before civilization, humans were more or less equal (Rousseau 1754, 89-91). That equality is what prevented humans from acting evil since they had no incentive to harm one another. It’s exactly that equality, Rousseau argues, that is destroyed by civilization. Below is a formalization of Rousseau’s argument for how civilization leads to evil: namely, that it creates inequality and encourages humans to compete with one another. 1. If humans form civilizations, then inequality will be present within their society. 2. If inequality is present within a society, people will compete for advantages. 3. If individuals begin to compete for advantages, they will commit evil acts in their ambition to get the upper hand. Conclusion: If humans form civilizations, they will become evil. Rousseau’s first premise, that the formation of civilization leads to inequality, hinges on the idea that civilization can only be formed when the concept of private property is formalized (Rousseau 1754, 120). The issue from Rousseau's perspective is that “...from the moment it appeared an advantage for one man to possess [property]...equality vanished…” (Rousseau 1754, 120). In other words, Rousseau is pointing out that private property (which is invented in tandem with civilization) leads necessarily to inequality. So, if humans form civilization, then they by necessity create an unequal state of affairs. Rousseau’s second premise predicts how humans will react to that inequality: “[inequality leads to]..secret desire of profiting at the expense of others…” (Rousseau 1754, 123). In other words, Rousseau holds that inequality will lead to humans competing with each other to gain the upper hand—to profit at the expense of others. Rousseau's last premise predicts the result of this type of competition: humans will develop “...a wicked inclination[;]... an insatiable ambition to injure each other…” (Rousseau 1754, 123). In other words, if they start competing, humans will eventually feel themselves compelled to do evil upon one another. Rousseau then links the conditionals of his three premises to conclude that if humans create civilization, then they will become evil. In other words, civilization is the origin of evil, since the inequality inherent to civilization creates competition, which is the principal motivation for evil. To further elucidate how Rousseau thinks civilization can lead to evil, let’s apply his theory to a case study: the corporation. In his aptly-titled work, The Corporation, Joel Bakan argues that a corporation is a sort of “...pathological entity, a dangerous possessor of…great power…” which can only, “...pursue, relentlessly and without exception its own self interest[: profit]...” (Bakan 2004, 1-2). Bakan alleges that this pursuit of profit leads to corporations behaving as uniquely evil entities. Rousseau might try to explain the corporation’s evil by reverse-engineering it: that is, we know that the corporation is evil. We further know that it is evil because it competes to maximize profits while disregarding moral concerns. We know that the corporation maximizes profits because of its fiduciary duties to investors—a duty to make money for its shareholders (Bakan 2004, 34). Therefore, the corporation competes to make their shareholders unequal to others; and to give them more money than non-shareholders. But for that inequality—the root of the corporation’s motivation to compete—to exist, civilization must be established (otherwise, every human would be equal in the state of nature). It seems clear, then, that the origin of the corporation’s evil is civilization. Rousseau’s theory appears to neatly explain the root cause of a corporation’s evil acts. The issue is that even though it provides a satisfying motivation for evil in the envy that is inherent to systems of private property, it does not argue well enough for the fact that evil is peculiar to civilization. That is, Rousseau fails to properly argue against the idea that evil could exist within the state of nature. One author, in particular, gives us good reason to believe that evil can exist in pre-civilization humanity: Thomas Hobbes. In his work, Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes also writes on the origin of human evil. In fact, Hobbes begins his argument in much the same way as Rousseau: he assumes a ‘state of nature.’ This state of nature is similar to Rousseau’s in that it also asserts that humans would be generally equal. However, Hobbes argues that it is exactly this equality that sows dissent and evil action amongst humans. Below is a formalization of Hobbes’ argument. 1. Without civilization, all people are roughly equal. 2. If one individual succeeds more than another to which they are equal, the other will attempt to rectify that through evil action. 3. It is inevitable that one individual will succeed more than another to which they are equal. Conclusion: Without civilization, it is inevitable that individuals will commit evil actions. Hobbes begins his argument by sketching out the fact that, within the state of nature, men are “...equal in the faculties of bodies and minds…” (Hobbes 1651, 74). Importantly, Hobbes will use this equality to motivate evil action, the inverse of Rousseau’s idea. Hobbes' second premise, that equal individuals will commit evil to maintain their equal status, is argued for in a couple of steps. Firstly, Hobbes asserts that equal individuals will expect equal levels of success. Then, Hobbes points out that if an individual sees another enjoying a higher level of success than them—through enjoying something that they both want but cannot both have—then the two individuals will become enemies and desire to destroy one another (Hobbes 1651, 75). This desire to destroy one another is the root of evil action—theft, assault, murder, etc. So, seeing a person to whom one is equal enjoy unequal success leads to evil action. Finally, Hobbes asserts that this type of conflict is bound to happen (Hobbes 1651, 75). This premise is reasonable when one thinks about what pre-civilization humanity would look like: humans, even if they were solitary, are bound to want certain things. Eventually, it seems inevitable that two humans’ desires would converge on something that cannot be shared—say, a bite of an apple. So, it’s reasonable to think that humans would eventually come into conflict. From the above premises, Hobbes concludes that even in a state of nature, humans are bound to commit evil actions. This conclusion is a problem for Rousseau: if evil action is possible within the state of nature, then civilization can't be the sole origin of evil. I imagine Rousseau’s rejoinder might target the second premise of Hobbes’ argument—that equal individuals could be incentivized to commit evil acts if they see their peers enjoying unequal success—by pointing out that a Rousseauist state of nature would not allow for that to be the case. Firstly, Rousseau places a large emphasis on humans being self-sufficient creatures (Rousseau 1754, 90). So, two humans would never have a reason to quarrel over some shared object of desire, as they can go out and find a just-as-good alternative. Further, Rousseau might point out that pre-civilization humans were solitary, further casting doubt on the notion that they might meet and begin competing amongst themselves (Rousseau 1754, 90). Perhaps the most compelling response to Hobbes’ second premise that is available to Rousseau, though, would be that his state of nature demands that humans not yet have a concept of private property. If no human believes that any particular thing is their own, then they cannot become incensed when they see another take it. That is, it’s not unfair to have something that isn’t yours taken away from you. So, though no modifications are technically necessary, Rousseau would have to delve deeper into the implications of his state of nature to sufficiently address Hobbes’ counterargument. However, Rousseau’s theory still has one more hurdle to jump: is his state of nature plausible? If it isn’t plausible that humans could exist as Rousseau has them within his state of nature, then he may as well be admitting that humans are by nature civilized creatures. In that case, the origin of human evil lies not within the organization of humans (civilization), but within human nature itself. What follows is an examination of the conditions Rousseau has set for his state of nature, where I’ll argue that they are not plausible. In doing so, I’ll show that Rousseau’s state of nature is implausible in its entirety and his theory cannot be correct. Firstly—is it plausible that humans could be (as a rule) self-sufficient and solitary, as they are in Rousseau’s state of nature? I believe that the intuitive answer is no. At the very least, humans must form mating pairs to procreate. Half of that pair—the nursing mother—cannot care for herself on her own. So, she needs her mate to forage for her while she takes care of their child. Further, a child cannot care for themselves; they are dependent on their parents to survive. Bonds like these show us that humans cannot be fully solitary creatures, precisely because they are not always self-sufficient. To implore the reader to believe the opposite, as Rousseau’s state of nature suggests, is to encourage them to ignore the reality of human life: we are defined by our relationships and interconnected dependencies. The upshot of my counterargument to Rousseau is this: Rousseau fails to show that humans are, by nature, not evil because his state of nature describes a creature that is, by nature, not human. That brings us to Rousseau’s other point: that without a concept of private property, humans could not feel slighted by another person taking something, even if the first person wanted it. I argue that even this isn’t plausible. Whether or not a certain pre-civilization human has a robust concept of private property, they must be able to understand that certain things cannot be shared. Take again the ‘bite of an apple’ example. Whether or not two pre-civilization humans understand what it means to privately own something, they can understand that they both desire a bite of an apple—something that only one person can have. In other words, envy (and the evil that comes along with it) is based upon mutual desire, not a notion of private property. As such, even in a pre-civilization society (before the creation of private property) two humans can come to envy one another and be incited to commit evil. Rousseau’s argument that evil is created by civilization fails because the conditions of his pre-civilization state of nature are implausible. For his state of nature to obtain, one must to alter one's conception of human nature so much that one makes the ‘human’ in question unrecognizable in motivation and psyche. But the very fact that one must change basic human nature to conceive of a non-evil human lends credence to the idea that humans are evil by nature. It would seem, then, that the Hobbesian perspective of the origin of evil—that humans are evil, even within the state of nature—is more accurate. Works Cited Bakan, Joel. The Corporation : The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power. New York, N.Y., Free Press, 2004. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Oxford University Press, 1651. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 2002. The Social Contract : And, the First and Second Discourses. Edited by Susan Dunn. New Haven ; London: Yale University Press.